Verify an artifact before you deploy it
A pipeline step that checks a deploy candidate against the seal or timestamp made in the build, with OpenSSL. Sigill has no deploy gate of its own: the step is yours, and it needs no Sigill service.
Verify an artifact before you deploy it
Sigill seals and timestamps what your build produces. It does not stop deployments, and there is no Sigill gate to install. The check is a step you add to your own pipeline, using open tools on the file and the evidence that sits next to it.
What the check tells you
- The candidate is byte for byte the file that was sealed or timestamped.
- Which certificate sealed it, and so which organisation.
- When, from the timestamp.
It does not tell you which workflow built the file. That link is kept in Sigill's record of the evidence (repository, commit, workflow and run, from GitHub's signed token), not inside the seal file. If you need it in the gate, read it from the evidence page or the provenance API.
Check a seal (.p7s)
openssl cms -verify -binary -inform DER \
-in app.tar.gz.p7s -content app.tar.gz \
-noverify -purpose any \
-signer signer.pem -out /dev/null
The command exits with 0 when the seal matches the file and with a non-zero status when a single byte differs.
-noverify skips the certificate chain, so pin the signer instead. signer.pem now holds the certificate that made the seal; compare its fingerprint with the one you expect (your seal certificate under Settings → Seal certificates, or the Sigill Platform Seal):
openssl x509 -in signer.pem -noout -fingerprint -sha256
A post-quantum hybrid seal carries a second, ML-DSA signature, and signer.pem then holds two certificates. Older OpenSSL versions may not be able to check that part. These commands were tested with OpenSSL 4.0 on a hybrid seal.
Check a timestamp (.tsr)
openssl ts -verify -in app.tar.gz.tsr -data app.tar.gz -CAfile tsa-ca-bundle.pem
See Verify a seal without a Sigill account for the certificate bundle.
As a GitHub Actions step
- name: Verify the candidate against its build seal
env:
EXPECTED_FINGERPRINT: ${{ vars.SEAL_CERT_SHA256 }} # sha256 Fingerprint=AA:BB:…
run: |
set -euo pipefail
openssl cms -verify -binary -inform DER \
-in "$ARTIFACT.p7s" -content "$ARTIFACT" \
-noverify -purpose any -signer signer.pem -out /dev/null
actual=$(openssl x509 -in signer.pem -noout -fingerprint -sha256)
[ "$actual" = "$EXPECTED_FINGERPRINT" ] || { echo "sealed by an unexpected certificate"; exit 1; }
set -e makes the job fail closed: a mismatch, a missing seal file or an unexpected signer stops the deployment.
What it leaves open
- A file nobody checks is not protected. The gate only covers the paths that run it.
- The check says the bytes are the sealed ones, not that they are safe to run.
- It needs the
.p7sor.tsrto travel with the artifact. Keep them next to each other in the registry or on the release.